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Introduction
After Japan’s experience since the 1990s, the risk of a binding Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)
stimulated a reconsideration of monetary policy transmission channels. One the one hand,
Krugman (1998) suggests a credible promise from the central bank that it will not raise
policy rates when the economy expands and prices begin to rise. Both McCallum (2000) and
Svensson (2000b) suggest policies based on a depreciation of the exchange rate. On the other
hand and despite a renewed interest, negative nominal interest rates were widely considered
as unrealistic until the Great Recession.
Negative nominal rates are one of the unconventional policies implemented after the
Great Recession by several central banks to overcome the ZLB. Danmarks Nationalbank
(the Danish National Bank; July 5th 2012) was the first to implement a negative interest
rate on reserves1. Since then, the European Central Bank (ECB; June 5th 2014), the Sveriges
Riksbank (the Bank of Sweden; October 27th 2014) and the Swiss National Bank (December
18th 2014) went into negative territory2.
The ZLB is due to the traditional assumption of paying zero interest rate on money. This
assumption might be reasonable for currency, but not for commercial banks’ reserves at the
central bank. Goodfriend (2000) and Blinder (2012) recommend to pay negative interest
rate on reserves (a carry tax) to overcome the ZLB. This is technically costless for central
banks, but its negative floor would be the storing costs of currency (otherwise commercial
banks would store reserves as vault cash).
However, paying a negative interest rate on base money (both currency and reserves) is
technically feasible (see Goodfriend, 2000). Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) shows that it
is sufficient to avoid and escape a liquidity trap and Buiter (2009) suggests several ways to
1Sveriges Riksbank set negative interest rate on reserves (its deposit facility) in July 2009, but this was
merely technical due to its fine-tuning transactions (see Sellin and Sommar, 2012).
2I consider in this paper the impact of setting negative interest rate on reserves or excess reserves. The
Bank of Sweden and the Swiss National Bank have recently introduced negative lending rates which might
have an additional impact, but this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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implement it.
Yates (2004) and Ilgmann and Menner (2011) consider that inflation and paying negative
interest rate (money taxes) are perfect substitutes. Menner (2011) confirms this intuition
and shows that, at moderate inflation levels, negative policy rates (taxing money) have a
positive impact on velocity and the real economy. Finally, McAndrews (2015) argues that
negative nominal rates are qualitatively different from positive rates.
To my knowledge, there is no empirical paper among this strand of the literature. I fill
this gap by examining the impact of implementing a negative interest rate on reserves. I use
data from both the euro area and Denmark.
Furthermore, paying a negative interest rate on reserves did not push retail banking
interest rates into negative territory (see Callesen (2013)). This suggests that banks’ behavior
should be considered closely.
I consider the impact on capital flows, banking flows (through the composition of banks’
internal vs. external assets and the composition of banks’ assets in foreign currencies vs.
Danish krone) and the Taylor-rule fundamentals model of exchange rates.
I estimate Markov Regime Switching with Time Varying Transition Probabilities (MS-
TVTP) models with the interest rate paid on reserves as a transition variable to assess
potential regime shifts in banking flows and exchange rates.
I find that paying a negative interest rate on reserves did put a depreciation pressure on
the currency due to a mild reversal in banking flows. This effect seems to be caused not only
by policy differentials, but also by a distinct impact3 of going into negative territory from
lowering interest rates.
3Money illusion seems to be the source of this distinct impact. See Shafir et al. (1997), Cohen et al.
(2005) and Schmeling and Schrimpf (2011) for evidence on money illusion.
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1 Methodology
Both Smooth Transition Regression and Markov Regime Switching are the main mod-
els used in the literature to estimate and assess potential regime switching in the data.
Both models do not assume any exogenous regime and allow the use of transition variables
containing economic information to explain the regime switching.
The shape of the transition assumed by Markov models is more suitable here (determin-
istic regime switching and both the logistic and exponential transition functions of the STR
models do not seem adapted for the analyzed data; see Hamilton, 2005 for a brief introduc-
tion to Markov models). Therefore, I estimate Markov Regime Switching with Time Varying
Transition Probabilities (MS-TVTP) models, presented briefly below, with the interest rate
paid on reserves as a transition variable to assess potential regime shifts.
yt = α(st) +X
′
tβ + t
where E(t|Xt) = 0, t ∼ N (0, σ(st)) and the indicator st ∈ {1, 2} which determines the
state at time t. The switching dynamics are driven by the following time-varying (which
depends on the transition variable) transition matrix:
 p11t p12t
p21t p
22
t

I assume that only the mean and the variance can switch regimes which allows a direct
interpretation of both regimes. If the dependent variable y is a proxy of banking outflows
and the estimations show a statistically significant regime switching, the regime related to
the highest mean can be considered the high banking outflows regime.
I use Z. Ding’s Matlab package (see Ding, 2012 and Perlin, 2010 for more details) to
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estimate the MS-TVTP models. Data4 is monthly and is collected from Reuters Datastream,
the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), the Danmarks Nationalbank’s StatBank and
the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse5.
I implement Carrasco et al. (2014) to test the hypothesis of linearity against the alter-
native of a Markov switching model. For all estimations, the null hypothesis of no regime
change is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative of two-state Markov-switching models.
1.1 Exchange rates
I follow Chinn (2008) and Rossi (2013) and estimate MS-TVTP exchange rate models
based on Taylor rule fundamentals to assess the exchange rate regimes.
Starting from an ad hoc characterization of the exchange rate/interest differential rela-
tionship6:
st+h − st = κ(it+h − i∗t+h)
with

κ < 0 if the home currency is in the numerator of s
κ > 0 if the home currency is in the denominator of s
And assuming that policy makers in both countries (I use asterisks to denote foreign
country variables) follow a standard Taylor rule:
it+h = (1− ρ)(µ+ λpit + γygapt ) + ρit + t+h
i∗t+h = (1− ρ∗)(µ∗ + λ∗pi∗t + γ∗ygap∗t ) + ρ∗i∗t + ∗t+h
4Database, codes and an appendix describing data transformations are available on https://sites.
google.com/site/anwarkhayat/research.
5I used Lanne et al. (2002) to test for outliers and level shifts, then statistically significant shift dummies
were kept in the regressions. See the on line appendix for more details.
6I set h = 3 to be consistent with the literature which mainly considers models with one quarter ahead.
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where pi denote the inflation rate, ygap the output gap and i the short term interest rate.
This imply the Taylor-rule fundamentals model of exchange rates:
st+h − st = µ˜+ λ˜pit + λ˜∗pi∗t + γ˜ygapt + γ˜∗ygap∗t + ρ˜it + ρ˜∗i∗t + vt+h
Despite being controversial, it is also common in the literature to assume that the central
bank attempts to stabilize the real exchange rate, qt, (see Svensson, 2000a and Molodtsova
and Papell, 2009):
it+h = (1− ρ)(µ+ λpit + γygapt + δqt) + ρit + t+h
i∗t+h = (1− ρ∗)(µ∗ + λ∗pi∗t + γ∗ygap∗t ) + ρ∗i∗t + ∗t+h
which implies:
st+h − st = µ˜+ δ˜qt + λ˜pit + λ˜∗pi∗t + γ˜ygapt + γ˜∗ygap∗t + ρ˜it + ρ˜∗i∗t + vt+h
Finding the exchange rate minus the central rate stationary at 10%, due to the spe-
cific framework of the fixed exchange rate regime in Denmark, I also suggest the following
smoothed specification which better suits the Danish krone vs. euro exchange rate dynamics:
st+h = µ˜+ ρ˜sst + δ˜qt + λ˜pit + λ˜
∗pi∗t + γ˜y
gap
t + γ˜
∗ygap∗t + ρ˜it + ρ˜
∗i∗t + vt+h
1.2 Capital and banking flows
I use Foreign reserves minus gold to capture the euro area capital flows7. And I use both
banks’ external (rest of the world) vs. internal net assets and banks’ net assets in foreign
currencies vs. Danish krone to assess banking flows in Denmark.
7To my knowledge, there is no published disaggregated data about banks’ balance sheets in the euro
area.
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I suggest ad hoc specification with the following independent variables in capital and
banking flows estimations: home and foreign output gap, home and foreign stock indexes
and home and foreign short term interest rates8.
2 The euro area
At June 5th 2014, the ECB decided the pay a negative interest rate on reserves (its deposit
rate). Figure 1, the shaded zone is the period when the euro area is in negative territory,
shows a sharp depreciation of the euro since this decision (more than 15% by the end of
2014).
Did the decision of the ECB to go into negative territory put a depreciation pressure on
the euro by impacting capital flows? To answer this question I consider both exchange rate
models based on Taylor rule fundamentals and the euro area foreign reserves minus gold.
2.1 The exchange rate
Figure 1: USD vs. Eur exchange rate
8The United States is the foreign economy when I assess the impact of going into negative territory in
the euro area. And the euro area is the foreign economy when considering Denmark.
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I estimate the Taylor-rule fundamentals model of USD/Eur exchange rate, but I allow
both the mean and variance to switch regimes. Results are presented in Table 1, they suggest
statistically significant regime switching. At the exception of the short term interest rates,
all significant estimations have the expected sign.
Without Real Exchange Rate With Real Exchange Rate
Variable Estimation Std-error† Estimation Std-error†
Intercept (state 1) 0.177115 0.136216 0.163323 0.133707
Intercept (state 2) -0.847114 0.153384∗∗∗ -0.894615 0.156394∗∗∗
pit 1.135148 0.536805
∗∗ 1.15901 0.527669∗∗
pi∗t -0.580208 0.241852
∗∗ -0.518549 0.245366∗∗
ygapt 0.650325 0.920841 0.600485 0.898789
ygap∗t -2.640218 1.19603
∗∗ -2.654795 1.140082∗∗
qt -2.042386 1.717724
it -0.035561 0.053358 -0.032081 0.052283
i∗t 0.226074 0.039689
∗∗∗ 0.230294 0.039769∗∗∗
σ (state 1) 0.147728 0.031519∗∗∗ 0.128585 0.031246∗∗∗
σ (state 2) 0.290339 0.049483∗∗∗ 0.303147 0.053504∗∗∗
Transition variable: interest rate paid on reserves
p(1, 1) 0.927826 0.26806∗∗∗ 0.945049 0.268672∗∗∗
p(1, 2) -1.305526 0.293768∗∗∗ -1.31199 0.294249∗∗∗
Testing linearity against Markov-switching models
SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv
20.094 3.344 4.429 6.266 33.405 3.425 4.304 6.883
Table 1: Dependent variable: differences of USD vs. Eur exchange rate
Transition variable: the interest rate paid on reserves by the ECB
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Transition probabilities plotted in Figure 2 suggest that the USD vs. Eur exchange
rate experienced several regime switching since the beginning of the crisis. The timing of
these regime switching coincides with financial stresses experienced in the euro area (the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Greek debt episodes, the sovereign debt crisis...).
A mild depreciation pressure on the euro seemed to have started in February 2014. This
is probably due to the decision of the FED of an additional (after the initial reduction in
December 2013) reduction in the pace of purchases of longer-term Treasury securities and
agency mortgage-backed securities.
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(a) Dependent variable: differences of USD vs. Eur exchange rate
(b) Smoothed transition probability of being in the depreciation regime: without the real exchange
rate
(c) Smoothed transition probability of being in the depreciation regime: with the real exchange rate
Figure 2: USD vs. Eur exchange rate
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2.2 Foreign reserves minus gold
I consider here the euro area capital flows through changes in the euro area foreign
reserves minus gold, an increase in capital inflows (outflows) increases (decreases) foreign
reserves. Figure 3 shows a decrease in foreign reserves since the euro area went into negative
territory.
Figure 3: Euro area’s foreign reserves minus gold scaled by GDP
MS-TVTP estimations presented in Table 2 suggest statistically significant regime switch-
ing. As was the case in the estimations of the exchange rate model, all significant coefficients
have the expected sign, at the exception of the short term interest rate.
Switching probabilities plotted in Figure 4 follow approximately those of the exchange
rate model and confirm the previous interpretation. Euro area capital flows (and by conse-
quence the exchange rate) were significantly impacted by financial stresses experienced since
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Greek debt episodes, sovereign debt crisis...).
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(a) Dependent variable: differences of foreign reserves scaled by GDP
(b) Smoothed transition probability of being in low foreign reserves regime
Figure 4: Euro area’s foreign reserves minus gold
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Variable Estimation Std-error†
Intercept (state 1) -0.013593 0.008314
Intercept (state 2) 0.024881 0.006648∗∗∗
ygapt 2.13226 0.460048
∗∗∗
ygap∗t -1.718673 0.537587
∗∗∗
DJeurot -0.070602 0.138832
SP500t 0.140659 0.151103
it -0.002165 0.002634
i∗t 0.004226 0.001763
∗∗
σ (state 1) 0.00058 0.000079∗∗∗
σ (state 2) 0.000544 0.000163∗∗∗
Transition variable: interest rate paid on reserves
p(1, 1) 2.362166 0.623557∗∗∗
p(1, 2) -3.505629 1.559062∗∗
Testing linearity against Markov-switching models
SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv
41.241 3.511 4.338 6.347
Table 2: Dependent variable: differences of foreign reserves minus gold scaled by the GDP
of the euro area
Transition variable: the interest rate paid on reserves by ECB
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
3 The Danish experience
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of going into negative territory, but isolating
its effect in the euro area seems delicate. The specific financial and economic tensions that the
euro area experienced since the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy (Greek debt tensions episodes,
sovereign debt crisis episodes, German constitutional court decision on ECB’s programmes,
euro area collective decision making...) and the several purchase programmes in both the
US and the euro area complicate the analysis.
To better identify the impact of going into negative territory, I consider in this section
the Danish experience. Denmark is a small economy, part of the European Union but not
the euro area, with a credible fixed exchange rate regime and its decision to go into negative
territory was merely a consequence of both its fixed exchange rate policy and the decision
of the ECB to lower its policy rates
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Furthermore, paying a negative interest rate on reserves did not push retail banking
interest rates into negative territory (see Callesen (2013)). This suggests that banks’ behavior
should be considered closely which is possible thanks to disaggregated banking data published
by Danmarks Nationalbank.
3.1 Monetary policy in Denmark
The primary objective of Denmark’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability. To
this end, Denmark has conducted a fixed exchange rate regime since the early 1980s (first
against the D-Mark and from 1999 against the euro). This is done within the framework of
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM II. The krone is kept stable within a narrow
band, it may fluctuate by up tp 2.25% on either side of its central rate, kr. 7.46038. As a
result Danish monetary policy interest rates initially track euro area policy rates(see Spange
and Toftdahl, 2014).
Danmarks Nationalbank conducts its monetary policy via its lending and deposit (current
account and certificates of deposit) facilities which are available to banks and mortgage-credit
institutes. Danmarks Nationalbank sets the discount rate (it does not refer to monetary
policy facilities, but acts as a signal rate), the current account rate, the lending rate and the
rate on certificates of deposit (see Danmarks Nationalbank, 2009).
Danmarks Nationalbank sets a limit for the monetary policy counterparties’ total current
account deposits. The monetary policy counterparties may exceed their individual limits
(which is determined on the basis of their activities in the money market), provided that
the overall limit is not exceeded. If the overall limit is exceeded, deposits exceeding the
individual limits will be converted into certificates of deposit.
Before going into negative territory, Danmarks Nationalbank set the current account
rate lower than the interest rate paid on certificates of deposit. Along with the limits on
the current account deposits, this helped ensuring a well functioning money market and
13
prevented the build up of large current account deposits that may be used without notice to
speculation if the krone is under pressure.
Figure 5: Deposit facilities before and after going into negative territory
Source: Jorgensen and Risbjerg (2012)
Due to its fixed exchange rate policy and in connection to the ECB reduction of policy
rates, Danmarks Nationalbank went in July 2012 into negative territory. After going into
negative territory, Danmarks Nationalbank set the interest paid on certificates of deposit
lower that the current account rate9 and adjusted upwards the current account limits. Figure
5 shows the adjustments of interest rates and current account limits.
3.2 The exchange rate
Despite the high credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime in Denmark (which means
that market participants take positions which in themselves stabilize the exchange rate of the
krone), one can assess depreciation and appreciation pressures when considering movements
around the central rate.
Figure 6 shows a depreciation of the exchange rate of the krone after going into negative
territory and an appreciation when Denmark went back into positive territory. I estimate
9The interest rate paid on reserves used in the estimations below is defined as the lower bound of
the corridor set by Dnamarks Nationalbank, i.e. the rate on certificates of deposit when the Danmarks
Nationalbank went into negative territory and the current account rate otherwise.
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Figure 6: Danish krone vs. Eur exchange rate
here MS-TVTP of both the standard and smoothed specification of Taylor-rule fundamentals
exchange rate models to assess these movements.
3.2.1 Standard specification
Results of the standard specification presented in Table 3 show statistically significant
regime switching in the movements of the Danish krone vs. Eur exhcnage rate. At the
exception of the output gap10, all significant coefficients have the expected sign. The central
bank reacts to an increase in the inflation rate by increasing the interest rate which appre-
ciates the currency, the central bank leans against the wind when the real exchange rate
appreciates and an increase in the past short term interest rates appreciates the krone.
The transition probabilities plotted in Figure 7 show an appreciation pressure at the end
of 2010 and until mid-2012 which is due to the perception by investors of the Danish krone
as a safe haven.
After this episode, the unilateral decision of Danmarks Nationalbank to decrease policy
rates by 25 basis points in May 2012 seems to have depreciated the krone. The exchange
10This is a recurrent problem in the literature, see Chinn (2008) for more details.
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(a) Dependent variable: differences of Danish krone vs. Eur exchange rate
(b) Smoothed transition probability of being in the depreciation regime: without the real exchange
rate
(c) Smoothed transition probability of being in the depreciation regime: with the real exchange rate
Figure 7: Exchange rate - main specification
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Without Real Exchange Rate With Real Exchange Rate
Variable Estimation Std-error† Estimation Std-error†
Intercept (state 1) 0.784419 0.26846∗∗∗ 0.715245 0.271041∗∗∗
Intercept (state 2) -0.179465 0.205856 -0.294141 0.239571
pit -0.309673 0.226248 -3.358696 1.379263
∗∗
pi∗t 0.50573 0.540524 3.453618 1.418006
∗∗
ygapt 2.050606 0.7765
∗∗∗ 2.045165 0.779244∗∗∗
ygap∗t 1.655859 2.108715 1.695429 2.121689
qt -0.198263 0.088238
∗∗
it -0.169889 0.191233 -0.284185 0.198508
i∗t -0.076472 0.216669 0.041071 0.225958
σ (state 1) 0.518362 0.064209∗∗∗ 0.481765 0.060036∗∗∗
σ (state 2) 0.362555 0.10622∗∗∗ 0.424509 0.144495∗∗∗
Transition variable: interest rate paid on reserves
p(1, 1) 2.293595 0.868354∗∗∗ 2.277595 0.813713∗∗∗
p(1, 2) -3.400777 2.263511 -3.733302 3.075361
Testing linearity against Markov-switching models
SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv
32.685 3.358 4.399 6.210 37.652 3.305 4.022 5.505
Table 3: Dependent variable: differences of Danish krone vs. Eur exchange rate
Transition variable: the interest rate paid on reserves by Danmarks Nationalbank
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
rate seems to have experienced a depreciation pressure during periods of negative territory
(despite several increases in the current-account limits) and an appreciation pressure during
periods of positive territory (see below for a more detailed analysis).
3.2.2 Smoothed specification
The specific framework of the fixed exchange rate in Denmark imply fluctuations of the
exchange rate st around the central peg set by Danmarks Nationalbank. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test, Table 4, show that both st+3 and st are stationary at 10% which allows
an alternative smoothed specification of the Taylor-rule fundamentals exchange rate model.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
Variable stat p-value
st+3 -1.9682 0.0472
st -1.7573 0.0749
Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
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(a) Smoothed transition probability of being in the depreciation regime: without the real exchange
rate
(b) Smoothed transition probability of being in the depreciation regime: with the real exchange rate
Figure 8: Exchange rate - smoothed specification
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Without Real Exchange Rate With Real Exchange Rate
Variable Estimation Std-error† Estimation Std-error†
Intercept (state 1) 0.126245 0.185314 0.123871 0.186628
Intercept (state 2) -0.578099 0.206422∗∗∗ -0.581217 0.207407∗∗∗
st − central rate 0.553187 0.057544∗∗∗ 0.556388 0.060249∗∗∗
pit -0.300095 0.187325 -0.54509 1.323662
pi∗t 0.144961 0.442629 0.397313 1.418334
ygapt 2.077814 0.581391
∗∗∗ 2.091036 0.584992∗∗∗
ygap∗t 2.415839 1.539417 2.365089 1.564784
qt -0.015537 0.083104
it -0.092968 0.151626 -0.101996 0.159484
i∗t -0.023958 0.172145 -0.015289 0.178908
σ (state 1) 0.221445 0.037753∗∗∗ 0.220113 0.0382∗∗∗
σ (state 2) 0.616664 0.107942∗∗∗ 0.619413 0.109555∗∗∗
Transition variable: interest rate paid on reserves
p(1, 1) 1.436901 0.960482 1.437717 0.977482
p(1, 2) -0.967367 0.254724∗∗∗ -0.96742 0.255398∗∗∗
Testing linearity against Markov-switching models
SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv
39.889 3.410 4.073 5.489 41.241 3.511 4.338 6.347
Table 5: Dependent variable: st+3 - the central peg rate
Transition variable: the interest rate paid on reserves by Danmarks Nationalbank
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
As was the case of the standard specification, results of the smoothed specification pre-
sented in Table 5 show statistically significant regime switching. And, transition probabilities
of the smoothed specification, plotted in Figure 8, confirm the conclusions and seem more
stable than the standard specification11.
3.3 Banking flows
Results presented above suggest that going into negative territory did put a depreciation
pressure on the Danish krone. As noted previously, retail banking interest rates stayed in
positive territory even when banks (and mortgage credit institutes) payed a negative interest
rate on reserves. This suggests that banks’ behavior should be closely assessed.
I consider in this section Danish banks’ balance sheet composition, banks’ external (rest
of the world) vs. internal net assets and banks’ net assets held in foreign currencies vs.
11Introducing higher granularity of the regimes might be more suitable with the data. Hierarchical Hidden
Markov Structure can be considered, see Fine et al. (1998) and Charlot and Marimoutou (2011). But this
is left for future work.
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Danish krone12. Results presented in Table 6 show that the composition of banks’ balance
sheet experienced statistically significant regime switching.
External vs. internal assets Assets by currency
Variable Estimation Std-error† Estimation Std-error†
Intercept (state 1) 0.040844 0.01011∗∗∗ 0.045724 0.011129∗∗∗
Intercept (state 2) 0.057547 0.015948∗∗∗ 0.018321 0.008208∗∗
ygapt 0.097304 0.256582 -0.057071 0.102827
ygap∗t 2.614083 0.613099
∗∗∗ 0.748492 0.282503∗∗∗
OMXCt -0.025906 0.032219 -0.006508 0.033824
DJeurot 0.037591 0.031398 -0.003631 0.032138
it 0.015280 0.008307
∗ 0.007459 0.006932
i∗t -0.031043 0.01043
∗∗∗ -0.019327 0.007938∗∗
σ (state 1) 0.000215 0.000053∗∗∗ 0.000514 0.000065∗∗∗
σ (state 2) 0.000507 0.000068∗∗∗ 0.000253 0.000081∗∗∗
Transition variable: interest rate paid on reserves
p(1, 1) 9.356073 10.314041 2.392929 0.949438∗∗
p(1, 2) -1.138888 0.354346∗∗∗ -3.317421 1.828852∗
Testing linearity against Markov-switching models
SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv SupTS 10% cv 5% cv 1% cv
25.885 3.036 4.147 5.704 11.544 3.272 4.158 6.004
Table 6: Dependent variables: banks’ assets by country and currency
†: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
Signs of all significant coefficients are as expected at the exception of both home and
foreign (euro area) policy rates. The fixed exchange rate in Denmark implies that Danish
policy rates track the policy rates in the euro area which explains these results.
Figures 9 and 10 plot dependent variables and transition probabilities of both estimations.
They both show a reversal in banking flows after going into negative territory.
On the one hand, after the decision of Danmarks Nationalbank to lower the interest rate
it pays into negative territory, banks (the impacted counterpart) seems to have reacted by
increasing its net assets in foreign economies and net assets held foreign currencies.
On the other hand, in contrast to banks’ external vs. internal net assets, banks’ net
assets by currency reacted sharply two months before Danmarks Nationalbank decision to
12Data on Monetary and Financial Institutions published by Danmarks Nationalbank experienced a struc-
tural break in October 2013. To avoid any bias due to this structural break, I chose to not include data after
this date.
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(a) Dependent variable: differences of external vs. internal net assets scaled by Banks’ total assets
(b) Smoothed transition probability of being in high external vs. internal net assets
Figure 9: Banks external vs. internal net assets
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(a) Dependent variable: differences of foreign vs. krone net assets scaled by Banks’ total assets
(b) Smoothed transition probability of being in high foreign vs. krone net assets
Figure 10: Banks net assets by currency
22
go into negative territory. This is probably the consequence of the unilateral decision of
Danmarks Nationalbank to lower its policy rates by 25 basis points.
4 Policy differentials or negative territory?
Setting negative nominal interest rates is one of the unconventional policy implemented
after the Great Recession to overcome the ZLB. But its impact is yet to be completely
determined. Is it the same to lower interest rates in positive or negative territory? Is there
a distinct impact of going into negative territory?
McAndrews (2015) argues that negative nominal rates are qualitatively different from
positive rates. In this section, I consider periods of negative territory in both the euro area
and Denmark and show that going into negative territory seem to have a distinct impact
from lowering interest rates.
I consider policy differentials between both the higher and lower bound of the corridor.
But I focus on the lower bound since it became the main policy rate of central banks after
the Great Recession.
4.1 ECB vs. the FED
Both the higher and the lower bounds of the corridor in the US and the euro area, plotted
in Figure 11, imply policy differentials that lead to capital outflows of the euro area during
the period of negative territory.
This is confirmed by the transition probabilities of exchange rate models and foreign
reserves, plotted in Figures 2 and 4. They show that during the period of negative territory
the euro experienced a depreciation pressure and significant net capital outflows.
Is this depreciation pressure due only to policy differentials? The different economic and
financial stresses specific to the euro area, the QE in the US and the euro area purchase
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(a) The higher bound of the corridor in the euro area and the US
(b) The lower bound of the corridor in the euro area and the US
Figure 11: Policy rates in the euro area and the US
programmes complicate the analysis. For instance, during the highest tension due to the
sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and despite an increase of the interest rate by the ECB, the
euro experienced a depreciation pressure and capital outflows.
The Danish experience, analyzed below, present several episodes which disentangle the
impact of going into negative territory from the effect of policy differentials.
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4.2 Danmarks Nationalbank vs. ECB
Denmark has conducted a fixed exchange rate regime since the early 1980s (first against
the D-Mark and from 1999 against the euro). As a result of the fixed exchange rate policy,
Danish monetary policy initially tracks the monetary rates of the ECB which simplifies
assessing the impact of going into negative territory.
Danmarks Nationalbank raised the current-account limits simultaneously when it went
into negative territory. This measure weakens the impact of policy differential that pushes
towards net capital outflows from Denmark. Despite this increase in the current-account
limits, one can note, as argued by McAndrews (2015), several episodes which suggest a
distinct impact of going into negative territory from lowering interest rates.
Both exchange rate models and banks’ net assets in foreign currencies vs. Danish krone,
unlike banks’ external vs. internal net assets, seem to react two months before going into
negative territory. This can be explained by the decision of Danmarks Nationalbank to lower
unilaterally its policy rates two months before going into negative territory.
Several increases (the end of 2012, mid-2013) during periods of negative territory of policy
differentials in the higher bound of the corridor (in favor Danish capital and banking inflows)
can not be observed during periods of negative territory.
When considering the lower bound of the corridor, one can note, at the beginning of
2013, an increase of policy differentials in favor of capital and banking inflows to Denmark
but this can not be observed. Instead, transition probabilities of both the exchange rate and
banking flows variables were stable in the depreciation regime and the high banking outflows
regime.
Furthermore, during the positive territory period in 2014, only the ECB lowered its
policy rates. This should appreciates the Danish krone but this can not observed either.
Finally, when Danmarks Nationalbank went back into negative territory in June 2014, policy
differentials between the euro area and Denmark increased again in favor of Danish krone
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(a) The higher bound of the corridor in the euro area and Denmark
(b) The lower bound of the corridor in the euro area and Denmark
Figure 12: Policy rates in the euro area and Denmark
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appreciation. But, not only such appreciation can not be observed, but one can note a
depreciation of the Danish krone during this period.
Conclusion
Negative policy rates were one of the unconventional policies implemented after the Great
Recession to overcome the Zero Lower Bound. The impact of this measure is yet to be
clearly determined. Does lowering interest rates has the same effect in positive and negative
territory? Is their a distinct impact of going into negative territory?
I assess in this paper the impact of paying a negative interest rate on reserves. I consider
its impact on the exchange rate and capital and banking flows by using data from the euro
area and the Danish experience.
I find, as argued by McAndrews (2015), that going into negative territory has a distinct
impact from lowering interest rates. It put a depreciation pressure on the exchange rate
through a reversal in banking flows.
Both McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2000b) showed that policies based on a depreciation
of the exchange rate can be implemented to allow the economy to escape from a liquidity
trap. The results presented above are to be confirmed with future research on the Swedish
and the Swiss experiences, but they suggest that paying a negative interest rate on reserves
can be an efficient measure to depreciate the currency which might allow the economy to
escape a liquidity trap.
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